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OPINION OF THE COURT
         
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves the interaction between the (federal) Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (TCA) and New Jersey state zoning laws.  It presents the question whether
the North Bergen zoning board’s decision to deny AT&T’s application for a variance to
allow the company to install microcell equipment on an already nonconforming
commercial building in a residential area is supported by substantial evidence, as required
by federal law.  The District Court found that substantial evidence supported the board’s
finding that AT&T failed to show that the building was particularly suited for the use, as
required by New Jersey law.  However, it went on to find that such a showing was not
necessary because the New Jersey Supreme Court would find that microcell installations
are inherently beneficial uses, obviating the need to show particular suitability. 
Accordingly, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of AT&T on its claim
that the board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.  We will affirm the
District Court because we find that AT&T carried its burden of showing particular
suitability.  We do not reach the inherently beneficial use question that formed the basis
of the District Court’s decision.
I.
     It became clear at oral argument that the microcell was actually installed after the1
District Court’s decision.  However its continued presence is conditional on our
resolution of this case.  Accordingly, there is no mootness problem.  Also,
notwithstanding the installation of the equipment, we refer to the variance as a proposed
variance in this opinion as we believe that it allows for a more natural reading.
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As we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts of the case, we will
only offer a brief summary.  Cellular Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T Wireless
(“AT&T”) provides wireless telecommunications services, and is licensed to do so by the
FCC.  In order to ameliorate a coverage problem, AT&T sought a variance from the
North Bergen zoning board (the “Board”) to place a “microcell” installation–two small
cabinets and two small antennas–on the roof of an office building (the Zepter Building or
the “Building”) in a residential zone.   The Building is already a nonconforming use and1
sits next to a large gas station.  It is located in an ideal and unique spot that allows the
small “microcell” equipment to fix the coverage problem.
At the hearing before the Board, AT&T had several experts testify to the idealness
of the location and the minor intrusiveness of the equipment.  However, one of the
experts testified that it might be possible to use two installations in nonresidential zones at
the ends of the gap pointing in to solve the problem, but that no alternative site feasibility
study had been done.
The Board denied the permit, finding that AT&T failed to demonstrate that the
proposed site was particularly suited for the use, because AT&T did not investigate
alternative nonresidential locations for the equipment.  Additionally, the Board found that
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the equipment would be an unnecessary and unacceptable eyesore for the objecting
condominium owners. 
AT&T filed suit in the District Court, claiming, among other things, that the
decision was not supported by substantial evidence, as required by the TCA.  AT&T
moved for summary judgment on this claim.  The District Court held that the Board’s first
finding regarding the suitability of the location was supported by substantial evidence
because AT&T failed to explore alternatives even though it conceded that they exist.  As
to the “eyesore” finding, the District Court found that substantial evidence was lacking. 
However, after supplemental briefing, the District Court predicted that the New Jersey
Supreme Court would find that the mounting of personal wireless facilities on existing
structures is an inherently beneficial use, thereby obviating the need to show that the site
was particularly suited to the use.  Because of this ruling, AT&T was awarded the relief
that it sought (the reversal of the Board’s rejection).  The Board appeals.
The Board argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the New Jersey
Supreme Court would confer inherently beneficial use status on building-mounted
microcells.  AT&T argues that the District Court erred in concluding that AT&T failed to
demonstrate particular suitability.
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331, because 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) subjects state and local zoning board
decisions to federal court review.  This Court has jurisdiction over the final order of the
     This deferential standard is similar to the standard of review used by the New Jersey courts2
with respect to zoning board determinations, under which the “courts will defer to a decision if it
is supported by the record and is not so arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable as to amount to an
abuse of discretion.”  Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704
A.2d 1271, 1280 (N.J. 1998). 
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District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
The Telecommunications Act expressly preserves local zoning authority over the
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.  See 47
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A).  However, one provision provides that “[a]ny decision by a State
or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or
modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial
evidence contained in a written record.”  47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).  “Substantial
evidence ‘does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” See
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment (Ho-Ho-Kus), 197 F.3d 64, 71 (3d Cir.
1999) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quotations omitted)).2
“In the context of § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), the decision process itself is governed by
applicable state and local zoning laws.”  Id. at 72.  Thus, our task “is to determine
whether the [zoning board’s] decision, as guided by local law, is supported by substantial
evidence.”  Id.  “Under New Jersey law, local zoning officials must weigh the positive
and negative factors associated with a requested zoning variance and determine whether,
     In lieu of particular suitability, an applicant can show “undue hardship,” which requires a3
showing that the property cannot reasonably be developed with a conforming use.  See Medici v.
BPR Co., 526 A.2d 109, 110 n.1 (N.J. 1987).  There is no claim of undue hardship in this case.
      In addition to particular suitability, an applicant may also need to show that the use promotes
the general welfare.  New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Borough of S. Plainfield Bd. of
Adjustment (South Plainfield), 733 A.2d 442, 449 (N.J. 1999) (“The positive criteria test whether
a proposed use promotes the general welfare and is particularly suited for the site.” (emphasis
added)).  But see id. at 445 (“Generally speaking, ‘to satisfy the positive criteria, an applicant
must prove that ‘the use promotes the general welfare because the proposed site is particularly
suitable for the proposed use.’” (quoting Smart,704 A.2d at 1278 (quotation omitted))).  In any
case, “[w]ith telecommunications towers, an FCC license generally establishes that the use
promotes the general welfare.”  Id. at 449.  Accordingly, there appears to be no question that the
microcell installation here similarly serves the general welfare insofar as that determination is
separate from particular suitability.
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on balance, those factors weigh in favor of granting or rejecting the request.”  Id.  “If the
proposed use is deemed ‘inherently beneficial,’ the positive criteria requirement is
automatically satisfied.”  Id.  Otherwise, the party seeking the variance must show that
“the proposed site is particularly suitable for the proposed use.”   Coventry Square, Inc. v.3
Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 650 A.2d 340, 345 (N.J. 1994).  With respect to
the negative criteria, a court must balance the positive criteria against the negative impact
of the use, “‘and determine whether, on balance, the grant of the variance would cause a
substantial detriment to the public good.’”  Smart, 704 A.2d at 1283 (quoting Sica v. Bd.
of Adjustment, 603 A.2d 30, 37 (N.J. 1992)).
III.
The District Court held that the Board’s finding that AT&T had not shown
particular suitability was supported by substantial evidence.  We will consider AT&T’s
challenge to this conclusion first.  The particularly suited use factor requires a finding that
     Although a somewhat recent Appellate Division case could be read to support the idea that4
all alternatives must be ruled out, subsequent Appellate Division cases have explicitly retreated
from such a position.  Compare N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’Ship v. Bd. of Adjustment, 734 A.2d 817,
820-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), with Ocean County Cellular Tel. Co. v. Township
of Lakewood Bd. of Adjustment (Lakewood), 800 A.2d 891, 899-900 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002), and Sprint Spectrum, Ltd. P’Ship v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment (Leonia), 823
A.2d 87, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)).  
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the general welfare is served because the use is peculiarly fitted to the specific location
for which the variance is sought in order to be satisfied.  See Kohl v. Mayor of Fair Lawn,
234 A.2d 385, 391 (1967).  Generally, a showing of need plus reasons why the particular
site is especially appropriate satisfies the requirement.  See, e.g., South Plainfield, 733
A.2d at 450.  However, an applicant need not show that the proposed site is the only site
suitable for the use.  Medici v. BPR Co., 526 A.2d 109, 112 n.4 (N.J. 1987).4
Here, AT&T demonstrated a need for the facility at that location, (DA 31), and
therefore the case turns on whether it showed reasons why the Building was an especially
appropriate site for the use.  This issue centers around the extent to which a party
requesting a variance for cellular service equipment must show the inadequacy of other
sites.  The Board found that AT&T had failed to consider alternative sites in
nonresidentially zoned areas.  The dispute arose from the testimony of one of AT&T’s
experts, who, when asked whether two nonresidential installations could be used to
achieve the same coverage, stated that it would be “possible if [AT&T] had a cell site, say
to the south pointing north and a cell site to the north pointing south to fill the [service]
gap.”  (Appendix of Appellee (PA) 65-66.)  However, he also testified that the Building
     We see no error in the District Court’s general reasoning that a zoning board plausibly5
could reject a wireless coverage variance application with respect to a residential zone
when it finds that a possibility exists to provide the same coverage using two installations
in nonresidential zones.  The two recent opinions AT&T cites to suggest that one site is
always better than two are both unpublished (and of no precedential value) and are more
nuanced than that.  As noted above, we believe that the particular suitability question is a
fact-intensive one, requiring consideration of the particulars of any given situation.
-8-
was “the best candidate in the area.”  Id. at 40.
The concept of particular suitability appears to elude precise definition.  It is an
extremely fact-bound inquiry, which does not lend itself to concrete rules.   There are a5
number of cases in which New Jersey courts have overturned denials of variance
applications with respect to wireless communication facilities.  See, e.g., N.Y. SMSA v.
Bd. of Adjustment (Weehawken), 851 A.2d 110, 119-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004); Leonia, 823 A.2d 87; Lakewood, 800 A.2d 891.  We look to these cases for
guidance.
In Lakewood, Comcast sought “to erect twelve antenna[s] on an existing
multi-story building in Lakewood, Ocean County.”  800 A.2d at 893.  “According to its
written resolution, the Board denied [the] application because of: (1) the ‘detrimental
visual impact’ the antenna[s] will have; (2) the public’s ‘fear and apprehensions’ about
radio frequency (RF) emissions; and (3) the existence of other suitable locations for the
proposed facility.”  Id.  The building was “located in the residential, office-professional
zone (ROP), or hotel district, which has among its principle uses professional offices,
churches and other houses of worship, and residential dwellings.”  Id. at 894.  The Court
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found that Comcast’s FCC license established that use promotes the general welfare.  Id.
at 897.  The Court also found that “Comcast presented compelling evidence
demonstrating that its site was particularly suited for its proposed” use because it was
located in a mixed-use zone and it was “utilizing an existing structure, rather than
constructing a monopole or lattice tower.”  Id. at 898.  The Court was troubled with the
board’s rejection of the application based on the availability of (unspecified) better
locations, as it could create a “daunting” and possibly “impossible” burden of disproving
the possible existence of better sites.  Id. at 899.  Accordingly, the Court reversed the
board’s positive criteria findings.  After rejecting the negative criteria findings, the Court
reversed the board’s denial of the variance application.
In Leonia, Sprint “applied to the [zoning board] for a variance to affix nine small
antennas to the roof of an existing five-story apartment building located in a residential
zone.”  823 A.2d at 89.  The Board denied the application, but the Law Division reversed,
and the board appealed.  Id.  The building was “located partially within the A-4 Single
Family Residential zoning district, and partially within the B Multiple Family Residential
zoning district.”  Id.  In explaining why the location was ideal, Sprint’s expert noted that
“using two separate antennas in other locations would be insufficient to fill the gap in
coverage.”  Id. at 91.   The Board’s expert testified that there was a potential two-
installation solution, but that it was inferior to Sprint’s proposed solution.  Id. at 97. 
Noting that the facts of the case had a striking similarity to those in Lakewood, the Court
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labeled the board’s suggestion that better sites exist “conjecture” and reversed the finding
that the site was not particularly suited to the use.  Id. at 98.  The Court also rejected the
negative criteria finding, and affirmed the Law Division’s reversal of the board.  Id. at
100.
In Weehawken, the most recent case of note, the Appellate Division was faced
with a situation in which Verizon applied for permission to install rooftop microcell
equipment, but the Board denied the application because “the proposal did not satisfy the
positive or negative criteria for the grant of a use variance.”  Id. at 112.  Specifically,
Verizon “chose a five-story, residential apartment building at 117 Parkview Avenue as
the ideal location for [a] new cell site” and “proposed to place fifteen antennas, arranged
in three sets of five, on the building’s roof.”  Id. at 114.  Verizon’s engineer, Dominic
Villecco, testified that the site was especially suitable because “it gave [Verizon] the
ability to see all the problem areas that we have” and, in response to a query as to whether
a particular water tower would suffice, explained why it would not.  Id.  Villecco
“concluded that there was no other potential location that would solve the coverage
problem as effectively as the proposed site.”  Id.  “The Board presented no experts on its
own behalf.”  Id. at 115.  Like here, on appeal, the zoning board did not attempt to rely on
the negative criteria, addressing only the issue of particular suitability.  Id. at 121.  The
Court stressed the factual similarity between the case and Lakewood and Leonia, and
reversed the board’s rejection of the variance application.
     Of course, the burden of showing particular suitability is on the applicant.  See Smart, 7046
A.2d at 1278.  However, where, as here, an applicant demonstrates the suitability of its chosen
location and its belief that no other more-suitable site exists through testimony before the board,
the onus, in a sense, shifts to the zoning board (or other objectors) to show why the location is
unsuitable in comparison to other alternatives. 
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It is quite apparent from the cases discussed above that the New Jersey appellate
courts, when applying the deferential substantial-evidence-like state standard, have
reversed zoning board determinations when the courts are satisfied that a showing of
particular suitability has been made.  In Lakewood, the positive criteria were satisfied
because “[(1)] the building was located in the center of the area which was experiencing
blocked cellular phone calls; [(2)] the zone included a mixture of uses, including
professional offices, schools, houses of worship, and both single and multi-family
dwellings; and [(3)] the carrier intended to utilize an existing structure, rather than
construct a monopole or tower.”  Leonia, 823 A.2d at 96 (describing the Lakewood
decision).  Here, (1) one of AT&T’s experts testified that the Building was “the best
candidate in the area,” (PA 40), as it was located in the center of the coverage gap; (2)
although the zone is residential, there are nonconforming uses, including a gas station and
the Zepter building itself, where the microcell would be placed; and (3) AT&T intends to
utilize an existing structure, instead of erecting a new monopole or tower.  The Board
does not dispute any of these facts, nor does it attempt to discredit the witnesses that
testified to them.  Also, as in the cases above, the Board did not identify any particular
sites that would be superior to the Building  or make findings that the experts were not6
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credible.  Thus, there are compelling reasons as to why the Building is particularly suited
for the use (especially the nonresidential nature of the buildings in the immediate area in
which the microcell is to be located).  The fact that an expert admitted that it is
conceivable that nonresidential sites exist on both sides of the gap that would allow
coverage of the gap through two installations does not render the Building unsuited for
the proposed use.
We conclude that the Board’s finding that AT&T failed to satisfy the positive
criteria is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.  The Board has not appealed
the District Court’s determination that the Board’s negative criteria finding is
unsupported by substantial evidence.  Accordingly, the Board’s denial of AT&T
application for a variance cannot stand.  Because of this determination, we need not reach
the issue of whether the microcell constitutes an inherently beneficial use. 
IV.
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
            
